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OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
Michael Eugene Begin appeals from a final judgment 
of conviction and sentence on charges related to his use of the 
internet and a cellular phone to send sexual messages and 
photographs to a minor in order to persuade her to have sex 
with him.  Begin pled guilty and was sentenced to 240 
months‟ imprisonment, representing a 30-month upward 
departure from the top of his advisory Sentencing Guidelines 
range.  On appeal, Begin argues that his sentence is 
unreasonable because the District Court failed to consider his 
request for a downward variance based on the asserted 
disparity between his sentence for attempting to induce 
statutory rape and the lower maximum sentences for actually 
committing statutory rape under state and federal law.  We 
will vacate Begin‟s sentence and remand for the District 
Court to consider his request. 
 
I 
 
In January 2010, a concerned mother contacted the 
FBI regarding sexually suggestive messages that her 14-year-
old daughter had received through MySpace, a social-
networking website.  These messages came from someone 
named “Mike,” who described himself as a 20-year-old 
Marine sniper.  Both the girl and the FBI agent who 
subsequently assumed her online identity repeatedly informed 
Mike that she was 14 years old, but Mike was undeterred.  He 
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continued to write her sexually explicit messages and sent 
two photographs of himself to her cellular phone: one of his 
face and chest, the other of his penis.  Ultimately, the FBI 
agent and Mike agreed to meet at a restaurant in Bradford, 
Pennsylvania.  Michael Eugene Begin, then 33 years old and 
not a Marine, showed up for the rendezvous, and FBI agents 
took him into custody.  In his possession they found a knife, 
handcuffs, and a condom.  Waiving his Miranda rights, Begin 
admitted that he had sent the sexually explicit messages and 
photographs and that he had intended to take the 14-year-old 
girl back to his room at the Riddle House, a boarding house in 
Bradford, in order to have sex with her. 
 
A federal grand jury sitting in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania returned a two-count indictment against Begin.  
Count One charged that Begin violated 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) 
by using the internet and a cellular phone to attempt to 
persuade a minor “to engage in any sexual activity for which 
any person can be charged with a criminal offense, to wit, 
statutory sexual assault, in violation of [18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 3122.1], aggravated indecent assault, in violation of [18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 3125(a)(8)], and indecent assault[,] in violation 
of [18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3126(a)(8)].”  App. 17.  Count Two 
charged that Begin violated 18 U.S.C. § 1470 by using a 
cellular phone to transfer an obscene image to a minor.  Begin 
pled guilty to both counts of the indictment at a change-of-
plea hearing in October 2010. 
 
In advance of sentencing, the United States Probation 
Office conducted an investigation and prepared a pre-
sentence report (“PSR”).  According to the PSR, Begin‟s 
counts of conviction grouped together and carried a base 
offense level of 28.  He received a two-level increase for his 
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use of a computer to commit the offense and a three-level 
decrease for his acceptance of responsibility.  In addition, he 
qualified as a “repeat and dangerous sex offender against 
minors” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1) and therefore received 
a five-level increase pursuant to that section.  His resulting 
total offense level was 32. 
 
The PSR calculated Begin‟s criminal history category 
by assigning points to his adult criminal convictions.  In 
1999, Begin committed several crimes involving minor girls.  
He was convicted of corruption of minors after it was 
discovered that he was harboring a 14-year-old runaway in 
his apartment, despite having told police that he had not seen 
her.  He was convicted of indecent assault for having sex with 
a “mentally deficient” 16-year-old girl on a public park 
bench.  PSR p. 10.
1
  Finally, he was convicted of indecent 
exposure for mooning four minors in a public park, asking 
them whether they wanted to “scratch [his] balls,” and calling 
them “sluts.”  Id. p. 11.  In 1995, Begin received a stolen 
bicycle and was subsequently convicted of theft by receipt of 
stolen property.  No points were assigned to a juvenile 
adjudication for Begin‟s rape of a seven-year-old girl in 1993, 
when he was sixteen.  According to the PSR, Begin‟s 
criminal history category was IV. 
 
Begin‟s Guidelines range was therefore 168 to 210 
months, or 14 to 17½ years.  On Count One, he faced a 
statutory mandatory minimum term of 10 years‟ 
imprisonment, and a statutory maximum term of life 
                                                 
1
 The PSR recites that this conviction was for “indecent 
exposure,” but Begin has conceded that it was actually for 
“indecent assault.”  App. 62. 
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imprisonment.  On Count Two, he faced no mandatory 
minimum and a statutory maximum of 10 years. 
 
The Government filed a motion for an upward 
departure from the advisory Guidelines range, arguing that 
criminal history category IV underrepresented the severity of 
Begin‟s criminal history.  According to the Government, 
Begin was a “serial sex offender whose criminal history score 
represents only a fraction of his prior criminal conduct.”  
App. 51.  In particular, the Government observed that Begin‟s 
criminal history score did not take into account his 1993 rape, 
and the Government presented newly obtained information 
that Begin had perpetrated other sexual assaults on minors in 
early 2010.  The Government further argued that the five-
level § 4B1.5(b)(1) enhancement that Begin received as a 
“repeat and dangerous sex offender against minors” 
underrepresented Begin‟s repeat offenses.   Section 4B1.5(b) 
applies to defendants with at least two prior instances of 
criminal sexual conduct with minors, and the Government 
submitted that Begin had engaged in many more than two 
such instances and therefore deserved more punishment than 
the section provided.  It was the Government‟s position that a 
range of 360 months to life imprisonment more accurately 
reflected Begin‟s criminal character and past. 
 
Begin, on the other hand, sought a downward variance 
from the advisory Guidelines range based on the disparity 
between that range and the sentence that he would have faced 
in either state or federal court had he actually committed 
statutory rape.  First, Begin observed that his Count One 
conviction for inducement under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) was 
expressly linked to Pennsylvania state statutory rape offenses 
that carry a maximum penalty of 10 years‟ imprisonment.  
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See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3122.1 (2000) (establishing the 
elements of statutory sexual assault); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 1103 (establishing the maximum sentences for different 
classes of felonies).
2
  Second, he observed that the federal 
offense of statutory rape within the special maritime and 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States carries a maximum 
penalty of 15 years‟ imprisonment.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a).  
He argued that it would be inequitable to impose “a longer 
sentence of imprisonment for using a means of interstate 
communication to help facilitate the commission of a crime 
than would apply to the crime facilitated,” and he drew an 
analogy to the Sentencing Guidelines for drug offenses, 
which set the penalty for a facilitation offense equal to the 
penalty that would have been applicable to underlying 
offense.  App. 44 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2D1.6).  Begin asked the 
District Court for a sentence of 120 months, which is the 
mandatory minimum under § 2422(b) and the maximum 
penalty he could have faced in Pennsylvania for statutory 
rape. 
 
At Begin‟s sentencing hearing, the District Court 
began by observing that neither Begin nor the Government 
had filed factual objections to the PSR but there was serious 
disagreement about the appropriate Guidelines calculation 
                                                 
2
 After Begin was sentenced, Pennsylvania revised its 
statutory rape statute to classify Begin‟s attempted conduct—
“sexual intercourse with a complainant under the age of 16 
years when that person is 11 or more years older than the 
complainant”—as a felony in the first degree, punishable by 
20 years‟ imprisonment.  2011 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act. 2011-
111. 
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and ultimate sentence.  Briefly summarizing the parties‟ 
written submissions, the Court stated: 
 
The Defendant . . . has filed a position with 
respect to sentencing factors in which he argues 
that we should vary from the guidelines based 
on the disparity between the sentence the 
Defendant would have received in state court 
had he actually committed statutory rape 
compared to the sentence he is facing in federal 
court for engaging in the crime of attempting to 
induce and inducing a minor to engage in 
essentially statutory rape.  The Defendant is 
seeking a sentence of 120 months. 
 
App. 96.  The Court determined that it should formally rule 
on the Government‟s motion for an upward departure before 
it addressed Begin‟s request for a variance. 
 
In support of its motion, the Government presented the 
testimony of Bradford City Police Officer Todd Erickson who 
had investigated allegations that Begin had engaged in 
prohibited sexual contact with three minors that were not 
included in the PSR.  According to Erickson, one of these 
girls told him that Begin had inappropriately touched her 
through her clothes and asked her over MySpace to have sex 
with him.  The other two girls had been together in Begin‟s 
room in Riddle House on several occasions.  One reported 
that Begin had thrust his hand down the front of her pants, 
and each reported Begin had vaginally raped her, though 
inconsistencies between their accounts made it hard for 
Officer Erickson to form a clear picture of exactly what had 
transpired. 
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After Officer Erickson‟s testimony and the parties‟ 
oral arguments, the District Court granted the Government‟s 
motion for an upward departure.  The Court explained that it 
found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Begin had 
engaged in several sexual assaults that were not accounted for 
in the PSR.  In addition, the Court noted the “particularly 
egregious” details of Begin‟s juvenile rape of a seven-year-
old.  App. 152.  Altogether, the Court found that Begin‟s 
“lengthy, continuous” criminal history, “primarily focused on 
sexually assaulting minor females,” supported the conclusion 
that criminal history category IV substantially 
underrepresented the seriousness of his criminal history and 
the likelihood that he would commit other crimes.  App. 152-
53.  Therefore, the Court found, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
§ 4A1.3, that the appropriate criminal history category for 
Begin was category V, making the applicable Guidelines 
range 188 to 235 months‟ imprisonment.  In addition, the 
Court found that the five-level enhancement that Begin had 
received under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1) for his repeat sex 
offenses against minors did not adequately reflect the 
seriousness of the sexual abuse in which Begin had engaged.  
Therefore, the Court made a further upward departure and 
arrived at a range of 188 to 240 months‟ imprisonment. 
 
Having determined the applicable advisory Guidelines 
range, the District Court indicated that it would next consider 
the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 
including Begin‟s request for a downward variance.  The 
Court heard oral argument from defense counsel and the 
Government but did not ask the attorneys any questions or 
make any comments on their presentations.  Immediately 
following these arguments, the intended victim‟s mother 
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made a statement concerning the impact of Begin‟s actions on 
her family and her daughter.  The Court also heard a 
statement from Begin, who apologized for his actions. 
 
The District Court then sentenced Begin to an 
aggregate term of 240 months‟ imprisonment, at the top of his 
adjusted Guidelines range, to be followed by a lifetime term 
of supervised release with a number of special conditions.  
The Court stated its belief that the sentence of 240 months 
was “sufficient but not greater than necessary” under 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a), and in light of “the nature and 
circumstances of this offense, as well as the history and 
background of the Defendant.”  App. 166.  The Court further 
explained: 
 
In particular, the Court has taken into account 
that Mr. Begin is a 34-year-old man who has 
pled guilty to two counts, both of which 
concerned his attempt to induce a minor to 
engage in illegal sexual activity.  The 
circumstances of this case are serious and if not 
for the intervention of the victim‟s mother could 
have resulted in serious and long-standing harm 
to the victim.  We have also taken into account 
[that] Mr. Begin has a long criminal history that 
involves a disturbing amount of sex crimes 
against minors.  We encourage Mr. Begin to 
participate in any available education and/or 
vocational training opportunities while he is 
incarcerated. . . .  In imposing this sentence, we 
have also considered the kind of sentences 
available and in the sentencing range set forth in 
the guidelines, including any relevant policy 
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statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission. 
 
App. 166-67.  Regarding the need to avoid unwarranted 
sentencing disparities under § 3553(a)(6) and the need for the 
sentence imposed under § 3553(a)(2), the Court stated:   
 
This sentence also takes into account the need 
to avoid unwarranted disparities in sentencing 
among defendants with similar records who 
have been found guilty of similar conduct.  At 
the same time, we find that the sentence does 
reflect the seriousness of his offense and 
provides just punishment for it and also will 
hopefully promote respect for the law and 
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct 
while protecting the public from further crimes 
by this Defendant. 
 
App. 167-68.  The Court never directly addressed the 
arguments raised by Begin‟s counsel nor explicitly ruled on 
his request for a downward variance. 
 
Begin timely appealed to this Court.
3
 
 
II 
 
On appeal, Begin challenges the reasonableness of his 
sentence.  Our review of a district court‟s sentencing 
                                                 
3
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The District Court had original 
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
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decisions is for abuse of discretion and proceeds in two 
stages.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 
2009) (en banc) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-
52 (2007)).  First, we review for procedural error at each step 
of the district court‟s sentencing process.  Id.; United States v. 
Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2011).  Thus, we ensure 
that the district court (1) correctly calculated the defendant‟s 
advisory Guidelines range, (2) appropriately considered any 
motions for a departure under the Guidelines, and (3) gave 
meaningful consideration to the sentencing factors set forth in 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Wright, 642 F.3d at 152.  If the district 
court has made a procedural error, “we will generally remand 
the case for re-sentencing, without going any further.”  Id. 
(quoting United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 
2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  But, if the district 
court‟s procedures pass muster, then we move forward to the 
second stage, and we review the substantive reasonableness 
of the sentence.  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.  Our substantive 
review focuses on the totality of the circumstances and is 
highly deferential.  Id. at 567-68. 
 
Our deferential substantive review of sentences is 
enabled by our insistence, as part of our procedural review, 
that the district court produce a record sufficient to 
demonstrate its rational and meaningful consideration of the 
§ 3553(a) factors.  Merced, 603 F.3d at 215.  The record as a 
whole must make clear that the district judge “has considered 
the parties‟ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising 
his own legal decisionmaking authority.”  Id. at 215-16 
(quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)).  
The district court need not raise every conceivable issue on its 
own initiative or even make explicit findings as to each 
sentencing factor if the record makes clear that the court took 
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all the factors into account.  Id. at 215.  “However, if a party 
raises a colorable argument about the applicability of one of 
the § 3553(a) factors, the district court may not ignore it.”  Id.  
In this, “we have stated at least one concrete requirement to 
establish that the sentencing court gave meaningful 
consideration to the relevant § 3553(a) factors: the court must 
acknowledge and respond to any properly presented 
sentencing argument which has colorable legal merit and a 
factual basis.”  United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 329 
(3d Cir. 2007).  A rote statement that the court has considered 
each of the § 3553(a) factors is not a sufficient response to a 
specific colorable argument.  United States v. Jackson, 467 
F.3d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Cooper, 437 
F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by 
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
 
III 
 
Begin argues primarily that his sentence is 
procedurally unsound because the District Court failed to 
discuss, or even rule on, his request for a downward variance 
in light of “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities 
among defendants with similar records who have been found 
guilty of similar conduct.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).  The 
Government argues that Begin‟s request so obviously lacked 
legal merit that the District Court was not required to address 
it, and that, in any event, the Court did in fact give it 
meaningful consideration.  We address these issues in turn. 
 
A 
 
Before we reach Begin‟s contention that the District 
Court made a procedural error by failing to respond to his 
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request for a downward variance, we must satisfy ourselves 
that Begin‟s disparity arguments have colorable legal merit.  
“The court need not discuss every argument made by a 
litigant if an argument is clearly without merit.”  Cooper, 437 
F.3d at 329 (citing United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 
673, 678 (7th Cir. 2005)).  Begin raised two distinct 
§ 3553(a)(6) disparity arguments before the District Court: 
first, he asked the Court to consider the 10-year maximum 
sentence that could be imposed for statutory rape under 
Pennsylvania state law; second, he asked it to consider the 15-
year maximum sentence that could be imposed under federal 
law for statutory rape within the special and maritime 
jurisdiction of the United States. 
 
1 
 
Begin‟s state-federal disparity argument lacks 
colorable legal merit.  As several of our sister circuits have 
observed, “Section 3553(a)(6) addresses unwarranted 
sentence disparities among federal defendants who are 
similarly situated instead of disparate federal and state 
sentences.”  United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1102 
(11th Cir. 2009); see United States v. Clark, 434 F.3d 684, 
687 (4th Cir. 2006) (“The sole concern of section 3553(a)(6) 
is with sentencing disparities among federal defendants.” 
(emphasis omitted)); United States v. Branson, 463 F.3d 
1110, 1112 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Adjusting federal sentences to 
conform to those imposed by the states where the offenses 
occurred would not serve the purposes of § 3553(a)(6).”); 
United States v. Jeremiah, 446 F.3d 805, 808 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(“Unwarranted sentencing disparities among federal 
defendants remains the only consideration under 
§ 3553(a)(6)—both before and after Booker.”).  This is so 
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because the purpose of § 3553(a)(6) is to promote national 
uniformity in the sentences imposed by federal courts.  See 
United States v. Parker, 462 F.3d 273, 277 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Indeed, “[r]educing a federal prisoner‟s sentence to accord 
with that of a similarly situated state convict may decrease 
one sentencing disparity but simultaneously enlarges another: 
that between the federal convict and all similarly situated 
federal convicts.  Because penalties vary from state to state, 
sentence reductions to approach state penalties similarly vary 
with the state in which the federal sentencing court sits, 
unjustifiably creating disparities among federal convicts.”  
United States v. Wurzinger, 467 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(citation omitted).  In other words, “[a]djusting federal 
sentences to conform to those imposed by the states where the 
offenses occurred would not serve the purposes of 
§ 3553(a)(6), but, rather, would create disparities within the 
federal system, which is what § 3553(a)(6) is designed to 
discourage.”  Branson, 463 F.3d at 1112. 
 
Begin attempts to distinguish these authorities on the 
ground that the indictment in this case specifically refers to 
state law.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), it is unlawful to use 
means of interstate or foreign commerce to persuade or 
attempt to persuade “any individual who has not attained the 
age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual 
activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal 
offense.”  Count One of the indictment against Begin charged 
that he intended to engage in sexual relations with a 14-year-
old girl, which would support statutory rape charges under 
Pennsylvania law.  According to Begin, this reference to a 
Pennsylvania criminal offense makes Pennsylvania criminal 
penalties relevant to his federal sentencing. 
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Tellingly, Begin has adduced no authorities in support 
of his novel proposition that when Congress refers to state 
law to define some of the elements of a federal crime, it 
intends to incorporate state sentencing considerations.  In 
their absence, we will not follow Begin down a rabbit hole.  
The federal government and the states are separate sovereigns 
with concurrent jurisdiction over various offenses, and they 
may therefore apply disparate punishments to similar 
conduct.  See Branson, 463 F.3d at 1112.  State-federal 
disparities are simply irrelevant under § 3553(a)(6), and the 
District Court was not required to address them. 
 
2 
 
Begin‟s federal-federal disparity argument is more 
plausible.  Begin argued that the sentence for his attempt to 
induce statutory rape under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) should not 
exceed the fifteen-year statutory maximum penalty for 
actually committing statutory rape within the special maritime 
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States under 18 
U.S.C. § 2243. 
 
In United States v. Ausburn, we vacated a district 
court‟s sentence for procedural error when the court failed to 
consider or discuss the defendant‟s disparity argument under 
§ 3553(a)(6).  502 F.3d at 330-31.  Ausburn, like Begin, was 
convicted of violating § 2422(b) by using e-mail and a 
telephone to facilitate his sexual relationship with a minor.  
Id. at 316.  At sentencing, Ausburn argued that the district 
court should consider the lenient sentences imposed in two 
prior criminal cases from the same district.  Id. at 317-18.  In 
particular, Ausburn‟s defense counsel argued that the district 
court should avoid an unwarranted disparity with the 46-
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month sentence imposed in the Kenrick case, id. at 320-21, in 
which the defendant had violated a different statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 2423(b), by traveling in interstate commerce for the 
purpose of having sex with a 15-year-old.  See United States 
v. Kenrick, 241 F. App‟x 10, 12 (3d Cir. 2007).  The district 
court failed to discuss the merits of this argument, instead 
merely reciting that it had considered the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities.  Ausburn, 502 F.3d at 
330.  On appeal, we determined that the district court was 
obliged to discuss, consider, and rule on the defendant‟s 
§ 3353(a)(6) argument and that its failure to do so constituted 
procedural error.  Id. at 330-31.  
 
Similarly, in this case, Begin has argued that an 
appropriate sentence should take into account the sentences 
imposed for similar federal offenses.  Under Ausburn, this 
type of argument has colorable legal merit.  We emphasize 
that colorable legal merit is distinct from actual merit.  There 
is reason to believe that the predatory nature of Begin‟s 
conduct and the knife and handcuffs found in his possession 
distinguish his offense from a run-of-the-mill statutory rape.  
Indeed, the stiff penalties under § 2422(b) are intended to 
punish and deter predators who use the reach and anonymity 
of the internet to perpetrate sex crimes against children.  See 
H.R. Rep. No. 105-557, at 11-12 (1998), as reprinted in 1998 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 680; see also Andriy Pazuniak, A Better 
Way to Stop Online Predators: Encouraging a More 
Appealing Approach to § 2422(b), 40 Seton Hall L. Rev. 691, 
694-98 (2010) (reviewing the legislative history § 2422(b)).  
Thus, when we say that Begin‟s claim has colorable legal 
merit, we mean only that, upon appropriate findings of fact, 
the District Court would be within its discretion to accept the 
argument and to factor it into the ultimate sentence. 
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B 
 
Having concluded that Begin‟s federal-federal 
disparity argument has colorable legal merit under 
§ 3553(a)(6), we agree with him that the District Court failed 
to make a sufficient record to demonstrate its consideration of 
that argument.  Though the Court summarized Begin‟s state-
federal disparity argument at the beginning of the sentencing 
hearing, it did not acknowledge that he had also made a 
federal-federal disparity argument.  The Court asked no 
questions during defense counsel‟s oral argument in favor of 
downward variance on this ground and made no comments 
about the issue following that presentation.  Strikingly, the 
Court did not even specifically rule on Begin‟s request for a 
variance. 
 
Nevertheless, the Government submits that the District 
Court‟s on-the-record explanation of its sentence 
demonstrates its meaningful consideration of the § 3553(a) 
factors.  To be sure, the Court articulated its consideration of 
several of these factors, including the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant.  But we have held that “a 
district court‟s failure to analyze § 3553(a)(6) may constitute 
reversible procedural error, even where . . . the court engages 
in thorough and thoughtful analysis of several other 
sentencing factors.”  Merced, 603 F.3d at 224.  In this case, 
the Court stated simply that its sentence “takes into account 
the need to avoid unwarranted disparities in sentencing 
among defendants with similar records who have been found 
guilty of similar conduct.”  App. 167-68.  This rote recitation 
of § 3553(a)(6) is insufficient to permit us to review the 
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Court‟s resolution of Begin‟s disparity arguments.  See 
Jackson, 467 F.3d at 841. 
 
The Government has suggested various justifications 
for denying Begin‟s request for a downward variance.  But 
“the question is not how we ourselves would have resolved 
the factors identified as relevant by section 3553(a) . . . .  We 
are not sentencing judges.”  Cooper, 437 F.3d at 330 
(quotation marks and alteration omitted).  We have 
recognized that “the sentencing judge, not the court of 
appeals, „is in a superior position to find facts and judge their 
import under § 3553(a) in the individual case.‟”  Merced, 603 
F.3d at 214 (quoting Tomko, 562 F.3d at 566)).  Therefore, 
“[w]here the record is inadequate, we do not fill in the gaps 
by searching the record for factors justifying the sentence.”  
Ausburn, 502 F.3d at 331.  Instead, we vacate procedurally 
unsound sentences and remand for the district court to 
exercise its discretion in a way that we can evaluate, and 
defer to, on appeal. 
 
IV 
 
Accordingly, we will vacate Begin‟s sentence and 
remand for resentencing. 
1 
 
United States v. Begin 
No. 11-3896 
_________________________________________________ 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: 
 I concur with the majority’s conclusion regarding the 
issue of federal/state sentencing disparities.  I disagree, 
however, with the majority’s decision to vacate the sentence 
and remand to the District Court for consideration of the 
alleged federal/federal sentencing disparity.  I would hold, as 
a matter of law, that the disparity between the two federal 
statutes raised here is irrelevant to the consideration of 
sentence disparities under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).  I would, 
therefore, affirm the sentence imposed. 
 
 Begin pled guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), which states: 
Whoever, using the mail or any facility or 
means of interstate or foreign commerce, or 
within the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States knowingly 
persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any 
individual who has not attained the age of 18 
years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual 
activity for which any person can be charged 
with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, 
shall be fined under this title and imprisoned 
not less than 10 years or for life. 
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18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).  Begin contends that the District Court 
should have considered the potential sentence he would have 
faced had he actually committed statutory rape in the special 
maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States and 
been prosecuted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2243, which states: 
 
Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States . . . knowingly 
engages in a sexual act with another person who 
(1) has attained the age of 12 years but has not 
attained the age of 16 years; and (2) is at least 
four years younger than the person so engaging; 
or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this 
title, imprisoned not more than 15 years or both. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2243(a).   
 These are diverse statutes. Section 2422(b) was 
enacted as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and 
subsequently rewritten by the Child Protection and Sexual 
Predator Punishment Act of 1998, which was intended as “a 
comprehensive response to the horrifying menace of sex 
crimes against children, particularly assaults facilitated by 
computers.”  United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 467 & 
n.4 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing the statutory text, legislative 
purpose and history).  It clearly contemplates situations 
involving the use of force or persuasion.  See 18 U.S.C. § 
2422(b) (specifying that perpetrator “knowingly persuades, 
induces, entices, or coerces” the minor).   
 
By contrast, § 2243 was enacted as part of the Sexual 
Abuse Act of 1986, which modernized federal rape statutes 
by, inter alia, defining the offenses in gender neutral terms 
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and expanding the offenses to reach all forms of sexual abuse 
of another.  H.R. Rep. No. 99-594, at 10-11 (1986), as 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6186, 6190-91.  Whereas 
other sections of the Act apply to sexual abuse involving 
threats or force, § 2243(a) “reaches noncoercive conduct” and 
prohibits sexual acts based on the victim’s age.  Id. at 16-17, 
1986 U.S.C.C.C.A.N. at 6196-97.  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 
2243(a) (requiring only that perpetrator “knowingly engages 
in a sexual act” with the victim and specifying age 
requirements), with 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (requiring that the 
perpetrator use force or threats to engage in sexual acts and 
omitting any reference to the victim’s age).  Indeed, § 2243(a) 
“applies to behavior that the participants voluntarily and 
willingly engage in” and “is intended to reach older, mature 
persons who take advantage of younger, immature persons, 
but not to reach sexual activity between persons of 
comparable age.”  H.R. Rep. No. 99-594, at 16, 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6197.  It thus provides for a “young lovers” 
exception by requiring at least a four-year age difference 
between the perpetrator and the victim, thereby excluding 
consensual sex between teenagers.  See 18 U.S.C. § 
2243(a)(2); see also United States v. White Calf, 634 F.3d 
453, 457 (8th Cir. 2011) (explaining that § 2243(c)(1) also 
provides a narrow affirmative defense that the defendant 
reasonably believed that the victim had attained the age of 16, 
“ostensibly to ameliorate the harsh effects of the statute in 
cases of otherwise consensual teenage sex”).          
 
 Because these two federal statutes do not address 
similar conduct, the disparity in their penalties is not within 
the scope of § 3553(a)(6), which is concerned only with “the 
need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty 
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of similar conduct.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).  I believe it is 
within this Court’s power to make this determination as a 
matter of law.  See, e.g., Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 
248, 253 (3d Cir. 2005) (“When the outcome is clear as a 
matter of law, however, remand is not necessary.”); In re Ben 
Franklin Hotel Assocs., 186 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(“Because the record has been sufficiently developed for us to 
resolve this legal issue, we need not remand to the District 
Court to consider it in the first instance.”).  I would, therefore, 
affirm the sentence that the District Court imposed. 
